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Flight and Fugitive Issues in
Bankruptcy Fraud Cases
Angela J. Davis
Assistant United States Attorney
Central District of California
Recent experiences in the Central Districtof California suggest that individualswho conc al assets will often try to
conceal themselves as well. Consider,
for example, the case of Robert Masket, a
Southern California businessman who commenced
Chapter 11 proceedings after a divorce decree
required him to pay over $2 million to his former
wife. Masket's bankruptcy schedules identified
several income-producing properties, but only
scanty liquid assets. Amidst rumors of a concealed
Swiss account, Masket refused to produce his
books and records to his bankruptcy trustee. After
the bankruptcy court issued a contempt order,
Masket sailed his luxury fishing boat to Mexico
and was apprehended only six months after
Mexico's issuance of the provisional arrest
warrant, as requested by the United States
Attorney's office.
In another case, Dan Young, the former CEO
of a for-profit hospital chain, was charged with
bankruptcy fraud and money laundering in October
1997. When civil proceedings against him reached
their peak, Young vanished, leaving one Mercedes
at his residence and another at the airport. Young
remains at large and is thought to be in China.
In other bankruptcy fraud cases, defendants
who have remained in the country have eluded
arrest by simply using multiple names and moving
frequently. Others have vanished after entering
guilty pleas. Recently, one bankruptcy fraud
defendant failed to report for a 15-month sentence
and two other bankruptcy fraud defendants failed
to report for "split" sentences. Another defendant,
Michael Knighton, failed to appear at a sentencing
hearing in which the Probation Office had
recommended a 24-month sentence. Although
Knighton was ultimately apprehended, he remained
at large for several months and committed another
fraud scheme while in flight. All but one of these
individuals had no criminal history.
Although it is impossible to say, definitively,
why so many bankruptcy fraud defendants flee,
certain hypotheses come to mind. The most
common form of bankruptcy fraud, concealment of
assets under 18 U.S.C. § 152(1), is, by definition,
a crime of "hiding." For an individual who hides
an offshore account or a secret corporation, the
concept of hiding himself may not be such a great
mental leap. In addition, people who commit
bankruptcy fraud are frequently in the midst of
failed or failing relationships. Individuals who file
bankruptcy frequently do so in response to a
divorce decree, the dissolution of a financial
partnership, or the demise of a business plan.
These events are certainly of a character to weaken
one's "community ties." Smaller scale bankruptcy
fraud defendants are also frequently engaged in
crimes of "hiding" and breaking community ties.
One of the individuals who failed to report for his
"split sentence," for example, had engaged in a
scheme of living "rent-free" by signing a series of
lease agreements under false names and false
social security numbers.
The end result in these and other cases is that
justice is delayed and too often completely denied.
In many instances, agents and AUSAs are forced
to devote precious resources to tracking down
convicted individuals.
What Can Be Done to Prevent Flight in
Bankruptcy Fraud Cases?
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One cannot assume that a first-time offender
who is facing a "light" sentence does not pose a
flight risk. AUSAs prosecuting bankruptcy fraud
should carefully consider what bond, if any, is
appropriate given the defendant's full
circumstances. In this regard, AUSAs should
direct case agents investigating bankruptcy fraud
to investigate the extent to which the target poses a
flight risk. In particular, the following areas should
be explored:
How long has the target lived in his/her
neighborhood? Does s/he rent or own? Is s/he
current on the rent/mortgage?
How many times has the target moved in the
last ten years?
Is the target working? How long has s/he
been at the current job?
Is the target speaking to his/her parents?
(Many are not and Pretrial Services sometimes
recommends a signature bond because "the
defendant was born here and his whole
family lives here.")
Is the target married? Happily married? If
the target is in divorce court (many bankruptcy
fraud targets are), find out from the lawyer on
the other side whether or not the target has
made all court appearances and whether or not
the target has cooperated with efforts to take
his deposition, participate in "meet and confer"
sessions, etc. Find out also who has child
custody and how often the target sees his
children. (Again, if Pretrial Services opines a
defendant won't flee because his/her children
are in the district, find out whether or not s/he
has visited the children in the last year or so.)
Is the target current on alimony and child
support obligations?
The above comments also apply to a target
involved in any other civil proceedings.
Verify the target's citizenship. If the target
is a naturalized citizen, consider the
possibility that s/he may have more than a
passport.
Do the target's travels suggest s/he has
foreign assets or foreign residences? (e.g., a
target who spends summers in Acapulco may
have a Mexican bank account and a furnished
residence that his creditors have not yet
managed to seize.)
In any case involving substantial losses, an
AUSA should consider seeking a third-party bond
with ajustified affidavit of surety and deeding of
property. In a case involving both substantial
losses and serious risk of flight, an AUSA should
consider seeking detention.
Plea agreements should also advise the
defendant that the government will only
recommend a credit for "acceptance of
responsibility" if the defendant demonstrates such
acceptance by virtue of his or her conduct and
complies with all of the terms of his or her bond.
Remedies After a Defendant Flees
Forfeiture of Bond
If a defendant flees after the initial appearance
but before sentencing, the AUSA should seek
revocation of the conditions of bond, forfeiture of
bail, and final judgment against the surety, if any.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 sets forth
the procedure for forfeiture and provides that if
there is a breach of condition of a bond, the district
court "shall" declare a forfeiture. Fed. R. Crim. P.
46(e)(1). The court has wide discretion, however,
to set aside a forfeiture if a defendant is
subsequently surrendered or if it otherwise appears
that justice does not require such a forfeiture. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 46(e)(2). Interpreting the rule,
appellate decisions have found that while forfeiture
is "mandatory," the district court has wide
discretion in determining whether or not to grant
relief from the forfeiture. See, e.g., United States
v. Stanley, 601 F.2d 380, 381 (9th Cir. 1979).
Multiple Sentencing Enhancements
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A defendant who flees following a release on
bond should be denied any point reduction for
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3E 1.1 and should receive an enhancement for
obstruction ofjustice pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1. Both of these sentencing adjustments are
applicable in cases where a defendant has fled, and
the adjustments should ordinarily be made even if
the defendant previously entered a guilty plea.
Application Note 3(e) to U.S.S.G.
§ 3B 1.1 provides unambiguously that the
obstruction enhancement is applicable where a
defendant "escape[s] or attempt[s] to escape . . . or
willfully fail[s] to appear, as ordered, for a judicial
proceeding." Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. §
3E 1.1 provides that "conduct resulting in an
enhancement under § 3 C1. 1 ... ordinarily
indicates that the defendant has not accepted
responsibility for his criminal conduct." In
instances of flight following a guilty plea, appellate
courts have affirmed district court rulings denying
the point credit for acceptance of responsibility and
assessing the additional enhancement for
obstruction. See, e.g., United States v. Loeb, 45
F.3d 719, 721 (2d Cir. 1995) ("It is
well-established that by willfully failing to appear
for sentencing, a defendant fails to accept
responsibility for the offense, regardless of whether
there was a plea agreement stipulating credit for
the adjustment."). The Loeb decision also noted,
"intentional flight from a judicial proceeding is
grounds not only for a sentencing court to deny an
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, but
also for the court to impose an offense level
enhancement for obstruction ofjustice." Id.;
accord United States v. Thompson, 80 F.3d 368,
369 (9th Cir. 1996) and cases collected therein
(obstruction enhancement and denial of acceptance
credit proper for defendant who flees following a
guilty plea).
In instances where a defendant flees and
engages in further fraud schemes while on bond,
AUSAs should also consider seeking an upward
departure on the ground that the defendant's
criminal history category is understated. U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.3 specifically endorses upward departures
where a defendant's criminal history category
"does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the
defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood
that the defendant will commit other crimes." As
the Ninth Circuit found in United States v. Segura-
del Real, 83 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1996), in
determining whether a defendant's criminal history
category adequately reflects the seriousness of his
past conduct or likelihood of recidivism, this court
may consider the defendant's repetition of the same
or similar offenses, and may base an upward
departure on this circumstance: "' [t]he recidivist's
relapse into the same criminal behavior
demonstrates his lack of recognition of the gravity
of his original wrong, entails greater culpability for
the offense with which he is currently charged, and
suggests an increased likelihood that the offense
will be repeated."' Id., quoting United States v.
Chavez-Botello, 905 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir.
1990). A defendant's post-conviction conduct may
also be properly considered as justification for an
upward departure of his criminal history category.
United States v. Myers, 41 F.3d 531, 533 (9th Cir.
1994).
Application of these multiple sentencing
enhancements may dramatically impact the
sentence a defendant ultimately receives. In the
case of Michael Knighton, for example, the
defendant's sentencing range prior to his flight was
24-30 months. Consistent with the foregoing
authorities, the district court denied Knighton the
credit for acceptance of responsibility, assessed a
2-point enhancement for obstruction, and also
enhanced Knighton's criminal history by one
category. Knighton's resulting sentencing range
was 51-63 months, and the court found the
maximum sentence was appropriate. Thus, the
defendant more than doubled his sentence by
fleeing the jurisdiction and engaging in a further
fraud scheme while on bond.
Indictment for Flight
In some instances-particularly when a
defendant has already been sentenced and then fails
to report to serve that sentence-AUSAs may be
well-advised to consider indicting a defendant for
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flight. A defendant's failure to appear before a
court following release on bond or failure to report
to serve a sentence is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
3146. The penalty for a violation of § 3146, as set
forth in § 3146 (b)(i)-(iv), is tied to the maximum
penalty for the underlying case from which the
defendant fled. In the case of bankruptcy fraud, for
which the maximum penalty is five years, the
maximum penalty for flight or failure to appear is
also five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(ii). Notably,
any prison sentence for violation of § 3146 must
be consecutive to any other prison sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 3146(b)(2). The applicable sentencing
guideline, U.S.S.G. § 211.6, also ties the penalty to
the maximum sentence for the underlying offense.
In the case of a failure to appear (or report for
service of sentence) in a bankruptcy fraud case, a
defendant's combined offense level is 17. U.S.S.G.
§§ 2J1.6(a)(2) and (2)(B).
Notably, the statute provides that
circumstances beyond a defendant's control
constitute an affirmative defense. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146(c). The sentencing guidelines also provide
for a 5-level downward adjustment where a
defendant voluntarily surrenders within 96 hours of
the time s/he was originally scheduled to report.
See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6(b)(1)(A).
Limitations on Use of the Grand Jury
AUSAs should familiarize themselves with the
United States Attorneys'Manual (USAM)
provisions regarding use of the grand jury to locate
a fugitive. Section 9-11.120 of the USAM
provides, " [i]t is improper to utilize the grand jury
solely as an investigative aid in the search for a
fugitive in whose testimony the grand jury has no
interest." However, if the grand jury has a
legitimate interest in the testimony of a fugitive, it
may subpoena other witnesses and records in an
effort to locate the fugitive. Id. The USAM further
provides, " [i]f the present whereabouts of a
fugitive is related to a legitimate grand jury
investigation of offenses such as harboring, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1071, 1072, 1381, misprision of felony,
18 U.S.C. § 4, accessory after the fact, 18
U.S.C. § 3, escape from custody, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 751 and 752, or failure to appear, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146, the grand jury properly may inquire as to
the fugitive's whereabouts." Section 9-11.120 of
the USAM goes on to state, "unless such collateral
interests are present, the grand jury should not be
employed in locating fugitives in bail-jumping and
escape cases since, as a rule, those offenses relate
to the circumstances of defendant's disappearance
rather than his or her current whereabouts."
Conclusion
The recent experiences of the Central District
suggest that bankruptcy fraud defendants may pose
elevated risks of flight. Agents investigating
bankruptcy fraud subjects should be alert to an
individual's ruptured community ties, overseas
assets, and other factors suggesting risk of flight.
AUSAs prosecuting bankruptcy fraud should be
mindful that an individual who is facing a "light"
sentence and has no criminal history may,
nevertheless, be subject to other circumstances
increasing risk of flight. Although detention is only
rarely appropriate in bankruptcy fraud cases, third
party secured bonds (with deeding of property)
should always be considered and plea agreements
should reserve the government's right to seek
appropriate adjustments to a defendant's offense
level in the event s/he violates the terms of a bond.
A defendant who does flee should be assessed
multiple sentencing enhancements and may also be
a worthy candidate for another prosecution.
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Many Hands Make Light Work-A
Bankruptcy Fraud Concealment Case
Audrey G. Fleissig
Assistant United States Attorney
Eastern District ofMissouriLast year, I received a phone call from a
panel bankruptcy trustee, who told me
that he was working on a Chapter 7
personal bankruptcy in which creditors
were told that there appeared to be no assets for
distribution. He also told me that he just received a
call from the debtor's daughter, who told him that
the debtor had more than $100,000 in cash hidden
in a safe and that the debtor had transferred other
real and personal property to others. The panel
trustee also told me that he called the United States
Trustee (UST). The panel trustee's referral to me
was consistent with his duties under 18 U.S.C. §
3057 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 586.
There is an identity of interests in a criminal
proceeding and a bankruptcy proceeding when
fraudulently concealed assets are at issue. This is
because fraud victims are frequently bankruptcy
creditors, and the goal of finding the concealed
assets and distributing them to the victim-creditors
is shared. This identity of interests poses unique
opportunities for cooperation and assistance during
all phases of the case.
Shortly after speaking with the panel trustee,
we assembled a team consisting of the panel
trustee, an Assistant United States Trustee
(AUST), and an FBI agent. The trustees brought a
copy of the bankruptcy schedules and the tape of
the 341 First Meeting of Creditors. The
bankruptcy schedules revealed that the debtor
claimed to have only $525.00 in assets. The
schedules also contained several entries that
corroborated the daughter's story. For example,
the debtor scheduled more than $167,000 in
liabilities, consisting entirely of credit card debt
from approximately 33 different credit cards. He
also claimed that he did not pay rent for the home
in which he was living, and claimed it belonged to
his sister. At his 341 Meeting, the debtor stated
that he had no other assets and had made no
transfers.
The Chapter 7 trustee's powers included
seeking a turnover order from the bankruptcy
court, or injunctive relief under 11 U.S.C.
§ 105 and Bankruptcy Rule 7065. The trustee
could also seek an order permitting him to enter
and secure the debtor's residence with security
guards. However, each of these options posed
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